Method and passion in Celso Furtado by Bresser Pereira, Luiz Carlos
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 4  •   D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 4
METHOD AND PASSION IN CELSO FURTADO • LUIZ CARLOS BRESSER-PEREIRA
19




The method that Celso Furtado used was essentially historical; his
passion —a measured passion— was for Brazil. In the second half of the
twentieth century no intellectual contributed more than him to the
understanding of Brazil. He was committed to its development, frustrated
with its incapacity to achieve it, and always acute in analyzing the
economic and political challenges that the country successively faced. In
order to demonstrate these ideas, this paper presents a broad review of
Furtado’s work.
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If there was an intellectual who, in the second half of
the twentieth century, gave a most decisive contribution
to the understanding of Brazil, I would not hesitate in
stating that that person was Celso Furtado. He did not
merely offer economic explanations for our development
and underdevelopment. More than that, he situated
Brazil in a world context, analyzed its society and its
politics, and offered solutions for the major problems it
faced. In order to achieve this task, as ambitious as it
was frustrating —because, ultimately, Brazil fell short
of his great expectations— Furtado used method as well
as passion. He was rigorous in his method, but this did
not prevent him from viewing with passion the subject
matter of his studies, which has always been a republican
project of life as well: the development of Brazil.
One of the books by Carlos Drummond de
Andrade (2000) is called A Paixão Medida (The
Measured Passion). This oxymoron, so deftly used by
that great poet, helps us to understand Celso Furtado.
The passion is strong, making his work and life full
of energy and desire for economic and political
transformation, but it is a measured passion which
weights costs and trade-offs —as economists usually
do— and does not overlook political restrictions.
Celso Furtado was an economist devoted to
development theory and to the analysis of the Brazilian
economy. In those two areas he always thought
independently, using mainly the historical method
rather than the logical-deductive one. He had a
powerful ability to infer and deduct, but he always
started from the observation of reality, avoided starting
from general assumptions on human behaviour, and
tried to infer his theories from that reality and its
historical evolution.
In this paper I will not try to make a general
evaluation of Celso Furtado’s work, but will only focus
on three elements in it. One element is well known
—his independence of thought— but the other one (the
method) has not been studied much, while the third (the
passion) is present in some form in all the analyses of
his work, but always appears in a measured way,
through expressions such as his love for Brazil and his
personal and intellectual integrity. Furtado is all this,
but he is much more. His struggle for the development
of Brazil and for overcoming backwardness in his
home region —the Northeast of Brazil— was conducted




Celso Furtado was a development economist. He was
part of the group of ‘pioneers’ of modern development
theory, along with Rosenstein-Rodan, Prebisch, Singer,
Lewis, Nurkse, Myrdall, and Hirschman.1 His
theoretical contributions focused on the understanding
of the process of economic development and
underdevelopment. And to achieve this, he used in the
first place, as we will see, the most suitable method
for the study of development: the historical-inductive
one. But, before examining the method he used it is
important to highlight the theoretical independence that
characterizes his intellectual path.
Furtado used the economic theory he learned from
the classics, especially Ricardo and Marx, and also
Keynes. He owed little to the neoclassics. He should
not be taken for a Marxist or a Keynesian, however.
He learned with the classics and with Keynes, but he
had an independent line of thought and always prized
this independence above everything. He is identified
with Latin American structuralism, inasmuch as he was
one of its founders.2 But we must keep in mind that
1 The ‘pioneers of development’ were identified by Gerald Meier
and Dudley Seers in two books: Meier and Seers (1984), and Meier
and Schultz (1987).
2 Love (1998) incisively highlights Furtado’s role as co-founder of
Latin American structuralism, although Furtado has always insisted
that Raúl Prebisch should be given this honour.
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structuralism is not nor has it pretended to be an all-
encompassing economic theory. It was an influential
economic doctrine in Latin America in the 1950s and
1960s because it offered an interpretation for the
underdevelopment of countries which, in the mid-
twentieth century, were going through the transition
from pre-capitalist or mercantile forms to industrial
capitalism, and it presented their government leaders
with a consistent development strategy.
The theoretical independence of Furtado’s thought
enabled him to use the theories he considered relevant
to solve the problems presented by the interpretation
of the economic facts he had to face. Marxism was
important for him to the extent that it offered a
powerful view of history and capitalism, but Marx’s
contribution to economic theory was less significant.
When describing how he learned from Marxism in
France, in the late 1940s, he says: The remarkable view
provided by Marx on the genesis of modern history
cannot leave indifferent a curious mind. Yet his
contribution in the field of economics seemed less
important for someone familiar with Ricardo’s thought
and acquainted with modern economics (Furtado,
1985, p. 31)
On the other hand, he did not believe in pure
economic theory, whether neoclassical or Marxist.
Furtado was never interested in this aspect of
economic theory. For him, economic theories existed
in order to solve actual problems. From his point of
view, economics is an instrument to penetrate social
and political realms and further the understanding
of history, particularly when it was still displayed
as present before our eyes (Furtado, 1985, pp. 15
and 51).
But how does Furtado seek to understand the
world around him? Not by applying any system of
economic thought uncritically. Nothing is more
opposed to Furtado than the stereotyped thought of
orthodox intellectuals, whatever type of orthodoxy they
adopt. He wanted to see the world with his own eyes;
to use the instruments of economic analysis without
losing his own freedom of thought and creation, which
was his greatest asset. As observed by Francisco
Iglesias: it is absurd to point to him as neoclassical,
Marxist or Keynesian: labels that are frequently
assigned to him. From every author or trend he takes
what he considers to be correct or adaptable to
Brazilian or Latin American reality. He adopts the
models that seem correct to him, without orthodoxy,
and does not try to apply them mechanically to
different cases (Iglesias, 1971, p. 176).3 Furtado did not
try in this manner to reconcile those theories, nor was
he being undefined, as suggested by those who want a
single, integrated view of economic theory: he was
only saying that one school of thought may be more
useful than another, depending on the problem faced.
As for Keynes, Furtado was, as noted by Bielschowsky
(1988, p. 60), an ‘atypical Keynesian’ because he
generally characterized underdevelopment as a problem
of shortage of saving. Shortage of demand would apply
primarily to developed countries. Nevertheless, when
describing the development process, instead of
adopting the attitude —typical among the pioneers of
development— of considering the concentration of
income as a condition for the beginning of development,
Furtado assigned wage growth a fundamental role in
ensuring an increase in aggregate demand and the
capitalists’ own profits. At this point he was already
being fully Keynesian.
His concern with the independence of his thought
became clearly apparent when he decided to leave Rio
de Janeiro and work in Santiago, at ECLAC, which had
just been created. At that time, ECLAC was still an empty
project. Furtado did not know Prebisch, who had not
yet formulated his view of the development of Latin
America. Even so, he decided to join ECLAC, in order
to escape the siege, gain an open horizon, even if I had
to wander in search of a lost Atlantis. He makes this
statement in A Fantasia Organizada (The Organized
Fantasy) (Furtado, 1985, p. 50), and goes on to
manifest his conformity with Sartre and his philosophy
of responsibility, according to which if we based our
real choices only on reason, there would be no choices,
and everything would be predetermined.
By deciding to go to Santiago, Furtado was telling
himself that his own life was not predetermined. And
he was thus consistent with his broader view of society
and the economy. Since he never believed that a single
economic theory was able to explain everything, he
always rejected all kinds of determinism as well:
whether Marxist determinism, based on the ‘laws of
history’, or the neoclassical variety, based on the
principle of rationality, which, by postulating the
maximization of interests, leaves no room for decisions
3 It may seem surprising to consider Furtado also as a neoclassical,
but this is what we see, for instance, in Mantega (1984, p. 90): In
the first place, there is a certain imprecision and even a good dose
of indecisiveness in this thinker, who wavers between classical and
neoclassical fundamentals, for me irreconcilable.
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or choices.4 On the contrary, if in the debate between
determinism and voluntarism Furtado committed a sin,
it was the sin of voluntarism, expressed in his belief
in the ability of human reason to impose its will on the
economy and society through planning, and, more
broadly, in the key role he always attributed to
decisions when it comes to thinking about the
macroeconomic system. The market has a fundamental
role, but the decisions taken are no less important. This
view is very clear in Criatividade e Dependência na
Civilização Industrial (Creativity and Dependency in
Industrial Civilization) (Furtado, 1978, p. 18), where
he asserts: The profile of an economic system is defined
on the basis of the identification of the centers from
which emanate those decisions, destined to harmonize
the initiatives of the multiple agents who exert power
in different degrees.
This rejection of determinism, including the
determinism of the market, is related to the
individualism and idealism of this great intellectual
who decided to intervene in reality. He started from
the conviction that he was part of an intellectual elite,
of an intelligentsia, that would be able to reform the
world. In this field, his master was Karl Mannheim.
As Furtado says: By following Mannheim, I had a
certain idea of the intelligentsia’s social role,
particularly in periods of crisis. I felt myself to be
above the determinants created by my social insertion
and was persuaded that the challenge consisted in
inserting a social purpose in the use of such a freedom
(Furtado, 1978, p. 19).
Gerard Lebrun, in his analysis of A Fantasia
Organizada, points out Furtado’s idealistic
voluntarism, expressed by his unshakeable belief in
planning – planning that would totally eliminate the
unpredictability of decisions. “Well,” observes the
philosopher, “his idea of power (in a democracy, of
course) seems so abstract, so well adjusted, a priori,
to his ideal of a neutral planning, that he apparently
hardly conceives that the planner might become a
technocrat” (Lebrun, 1985).
As a matter of fact, this outstanding economist of
whom we are speaking is a scientist, but also a
bureaucrat in the best sense of the word, a Statesman,
a public policymaker who only ceased to be inserted
in the State apparatus when the military dictatorship
suspended his political rights. Celso Furtado started his
professional life in the DASP (Public Service
Administrative Department), as a public administration
technician. He went beyond that phase to become an
economist and a university professor, but he never gave
up believing in the rationalizing power of bureaucracy,
including middle-level bureaucracy. He often said that
the sole social group that was able to act as an
interlocutor with international powers was the State
bureaucracy. And for him it was essential to strengthen
the bureaucracy in democratic regimes in order to
maintain public policies and the effectiveness and
legitimacy of the State power. As he says in A Fantasia
Desfeita (The Faded Fantasy): The process of
bureaucratization does not only mean the growth of the
State apparatus, it also means significant changes in
political processes. By increasing the effectiveness of
power, bureaucratization consolidates it at lower levels
of legitimacy (Furtado, 1989, p. 185).
With this line of thinking, Furtado is faithful to
what he learned from such different thinkers as
Mannheim, Sartre and his teacher Cornu.5 In capitalist
democracies intellectuals may free themselves from
ideologies and use their freedom to intervene in the
world in a republican way. He knows that this is always
a relative freedom, that we may build our own lives,
but we cannot have any illusions regarding the social
and political determinants to which we are subject. For
great intellectuals such as Furtado, the dialectics
between freedom and socially conditioned behaviour
can be more conscious and, if accompanied by the
virtue of courage, as in his case, this will be more
favourable to freedom, but only more favourable, no
more than this: nobody escapes his circumstances.
Intellectual courage is expressed primarily in
moments when it is necessary to differ from one’s
environment and group. In 1962, right in the middle
of the country’s political radicalization, Celso Furtado
published A Pré-Revolução Brasileira (The Brazilian
Pre-Revolution). After praising the humanistic nature
of Marx’s work, Furtado does not hesitate to declare:
Since Marxism-Leninism is based on the replacement
of one class dictatorship with another, it would be a
regression, from a political point of view, to apply it
to societies which have reached more complex forms
of social coexistence, that is, to modern open societies
(Furtado, 1962, p. 27).
5 Quoted by Furtado (1985, p. 31).
4 The deterministic nature of neoclassical thought was shaken only
when microeconomics textbooks began to include game theory –
that is, decision theory. But by then their authors were taking the
healthy attitude of relativizing the maximizing postulate of
neoclassical theory.
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Likewise, in the Plan Trienal 1963-1965 (Triennial
Plan, 1963-1965) (1963) he did not hesitate to propose
a fiscal adjustment and a strict monetary policy, although
he knew that he would be called ‘monetarist’ by the
groups that supported the Goulart administration.
The use of freedom gains its full meaning in
Furtado because it is marked by the gift of creativity.
Furtado’s contribution to economic theory and to the
analysis of Brazilian and Latin American economies
may be explained in terms of method, but it is primarily
the result of an enormous personal ability to think and
create. Furtado knew this, and it is certainly not by
chance that the epigraph of one of his books is a
quotation from Popper in which he acknowledges that
scientific discovery is impossible without faith in ideas
which are of a purely speculative kind, and sometimes
even quite hazy.6
Creativity was to be one of the bases of his
intellectual independence from orthodoxy. Lebrun
(1985), writing on A Fantasia Organizada, remarks:
It is the odor of heterodoxy that makes this book even
more fascinating and makes Celso Furtado a great
writer, as well as a thinker. As observed by Bourdieu
(1983, p. 145) if in economic theory there is a “doxy”
—a set of assumptions that antagonists regard as
evident— there is also an orthodoxy and an heterodoxy.
The heterodox intellectual does not deny his science’s
most general assumptions, but refuses to subordinate
his thought to the dominant one. The Right and the
conventional economists insist on giving heterodoxy
a negative meaning, identifying it with economic
populism, but, in fact, to innovate in economic theory
and analyses almost always involves some heterodoxy.
To be heterodox is to develop new theories, often from
the identification of new historical facts that modify a
certain economic and social setting and make pre-
existent theories inadequate. When Celso Furtado opted
to use mainly the historical-inductive method, and
when he became one of the two founders of Latin
American structuralism, he was opting for heterodoxy
and for independence of thought. In the next section,
I will briefly present my view of the two methods used
in economic theory, after which I will continue my
analysis of the method used by Celso Furtado.
6 Epigraph to the Prefácio a Nova Economia Política (Preface to
New Political Economy) (Furtado, 1976a).
III
Two methods in economics
Orthodoxy, or neoclassical mainstream, is primarily
logical-deductive. It intends to deduce the balanced
operation of market economies from the sole
assumption that economic agents maximize their
interests. If we classify sciences as adjectival or
methodological, there is no substantive science more
logical-deductive than neoclassical economic science,
in spite of the statements that it is a positive science.
Paradoxical as it may seem, not even physics is as
logical-deductive. The supremacy of the logical-
deductive method is such that I always recall the
observation of a former student who had just returned
from a scholarship in a foreign university. When I told
him that, for me, in certain fundamental areas, such as
macroeconomics and economic development, the
economist should use predominantly the historical-
inductive method instead of the logical-deductive one,
he immediately replied: “but in economics, the logical-
deductive method is always dominant; we don’t study
history, we study economic theory”. For him, as for
the whole of neoclassical thought, economic theory is
by definition logical-deductive.
Economic theory is abstract by definition, and
cannot be confused with history. In economics we try
to find models, theories, to explain the stability and
variation of economic aggregates, the short-term
economic cycle and development, inflation or deflation
and the balance of payments, and the variation of
relative prices, of interest rates and of the exchange
rate. The subject matter of economic theory is therefore
clear, as it is clear that the aim is to generalize with
respect to the behaviour of relevant variables, and,
through this generalization, to be able to predict the
behaviour of economic variables. Therefore, it is
important to acknowledge that, depending on the
subject discussed, the most appropriate method will
sometimes be the logical-deductive one, and sometimes
the historical-inductive one.
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In another paper, I advocated the idea that
macroeconomics cannot be reduced to microeconomics
because the former uses predominantly the historical-
deductive method whereas the latter uses the logical-
deductive method. The statement that the advance of
knowledge depends on the joint use of the two methods
is part of the introductory classes in philosophy. In the
process of knowing, individuals make permanent use
of induction and deduction, one following the other and
vice versa. Induction and deduction are not, therefore,
methods of knowledge, or, more precisely, opposite
mental operations. They are complementary. This does
not mean, however, that sciences use one method or
the other with the same intensity. Mathematics, for
instance, is only logical-deductive, while sociology is
mainly historical-inductive. In mathematics everything
is deduced from a few identities; in sociology and the
other social sciences, with the exception of the
neoclassical variant of economics (recently extended
to political science), the observation of social facts and
their evolution in time is the fundamental method of
research, although the researcher is permanently forced
to also use the deductive method to perform his analysis.
Therefore, I am not corroborating the belief
—predominant in the nineteenth century— that the use
of the inductive method would distinguish true science,
which would begin with the observation of facts and
the execution of experiments to ultimately arrive at
general laws. As Hume’s ‘problem of induction’ made
clear, we may infer general laws from induction, but
the inferences thus performed do not thereby become
logically demonstrated.7 The historical-inductive
method does not exclude the logical-deductive one. In
macroeconomics and in the theory of economic
development, however, it takes precedence over the
logical-deductive method, whereas the opposite is true
for microeconomics.
I consider the neoclassical theory of general
equilibrium a remarkable contribution to the
understanding of how market economies operate. But
this does not mean that the whole of economic theory
can be subordinated to it. A second branch of economic
theory —macroeconomics— cannot be reduced to
microeconomics because one deals with the behaviour
of economic agents and the other with economic
aggregates – this is only a definition. Microeconomics,
or, more precisely, the general equilibrium model that
serves as its basis, approaches economy from a logical-
deductive perspective, deducing the way by which
resources are allocated and income distributed in a
market economy from a single assumption: the rational
behaviour of the agents concerned. Macroeconomics,
on the other hand, was born and continues to bear its
greatest fruits when it observes the behaviour of
economic aggregates, verifies how this behaviour tends
to repeat itself, and generalizes therefrom, building
models or theories. Subsequently, macroeconomists try
to find a logical reason, a microeconomic fundamental
for the behaviour of macroeconomic aggregates, but at
most they will find ad hoc explanations. The
neoclassical hope of reducing macroeconomics to
microeconomics cannot be achieved, because the
methods prevailing in each of those branches of
economic science are different.8 It is likewise impossible
to reduce the third major branch of economic theory
—the theory of economic development— to
microeconomics or macroeconomics. In this case, the
core of the thinking is still classical, just as the core
of microeconomic thinking is neoclassical, and the core
of macroeconomic thinking is Keynesian.
Economic theory tries to explain and predict the
behaviour of economic variables. It is necessary,
however, to determine the variable in which we are
interested. If we want to understand and predict the
behaviour of prices and the allocation of resources in
the economy, microeconomic theory, with its logical-
deductive basis, will be more effective; if we want to
understand the distribution of income in the long run
in the capitalist system, the reversal of classical theory,
by placing the profit rate as given and the wage rate
as a residue, will have a higher predictive power; if,
on the other hand, we want to understand the behaviour
of economic cycles, Keynesian-based macroeconomics
will be the instrument par excellence; and finally, in
order to understand the dynamics of development,
classical history-based development theory will be the
one with the highest power of explanation and
prediction.
According to this reasoning, it is impossible to
have an absolutely integrated view of economic
science. Economic science has three major branches:
7 See Blaug (1980, pp. 11-12). This author uses Hume’s problem of
induction to reduce its role in economic theory. Like most
economists, he presumes that there is only “one single” economic
theory, and therefore the predominant use of one method or the
other, depending on the approach —microeconomic,
macroeconomic, or of economic development— makes no sense
for him. 8 See Bresser-Pereira and Tadeu Lima (1996).
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microeconomics, macroeconomics, and development
theory. Each one of them provides us with a view of
the operation of the economic system from a certain
perspective, using one prevailing method. Of these
three branches, only in microeconomics is the logical-
deductive method dominant, and rightly so. It was this
method that made it possible to build the microeconomic
models of partial and general equilibrium, which
constitute one of the major scientific achievements of
universal thought. Through this method we can
understand how a market economy allocates resources.
Yet the theory of economic development —which
explains the growth process of capitalist economies in
the long run— and macroeconomics —which shows
how economies behave in the economic cycle—
although using the logical-deductive method, were built
from the observation of historical phenomena. Smith
and Marx, who founded the first of these, observed the
transition from pre-capitalist forms to capitalism, and
theorized on the basis of that observation. The classical
theory of income distribution also has a historical
nature, although, with the change in the behaviour of
the wage rate from the mid-nineteenth century on, it
only continued to make sense when it was inverted: the
long-term profit rate proved to be stable enough to be
considered constant, and therefore it is possible to
predict that the wage rate will increase with productivity
as long as technical progress is neutral. Keynes and
Kalecki, who were responsible for the appearance of
macroeconomics, began with the observation of the
economic cycle after the First World War, and
theorized from there on: they also primarily used the
historical-inductive method. Ricardo’s great contribution
to the theory of economic development —the law of
comparative advantages in international trade— was a
great logical-deductive effort, but even in this case it
was based on the observation of what happened in
England and took into account the business interests
of that country, rather than the rational behaviour of
its economic agents.
Friedman’s criticism of Keynesian macroeconomic
policy —the discovery that through adaptive
expectations the economic agents would partly
neutralize that policy— started rather from the
observation of reality, although it has an obvious
microeconomic foundation. This criticism did not
invalidate macroeconomic policy but limited its scope.
When, however, macroeconomic theory detached itself
from reality and radicalized the logical-deductive
approach, as happened with the rational expectations
hypothesis, we have an absurd and empty theoretical
construct, despite its apparent consistency, which
transforms economic theory into a mere ideology.
According to this distortion of economic theory,
macroeconomic policies would be completely
ineffective, since they would be neutralized by the
agents’ rational expectations. Well, this assertion
contradicts daily experience, in which we see the
economic authorities of all nations actively involved
in economic policy. The radical use of the logical-
deductive method led theory to ignore historical reality.
For some time during the 1980s, economic
policymakers in the ministries of finance and in the
central banks accepted the radical version of
monetarism proposed by the rational expectations
hypothesis, but since the beginning of the 1990s they
have abandoned monetarism and started to adopt the
pragmatic strategy of inflation targeting.
Another common distortion that arises from the
pretension of using the logical-deductive method to
explain all economic phenomena is that resulting from
the insistence on employing a certain model when reality
does not conform to it. At that moment, economic theory
becomes an obstacle rather than an instrument for the
analysis of what is happening. When economists manage
to overcome this obstacle and actually think, analyzing
the new facts that demand new analyses, they are forced
to abandon the pre-existent models. In this case, as
observed by Tony Lawson, the only thing that remains
intact is an adherence to formalist and, therefore,
deductivist closed systems of modeling (Lawson, 1999,
pp. 6-7). 9
Therefore, I view with skepticism the attempts to
unify microeconomics, macroeconomics and
development theory. Those approaches are not
mutually reducible, because they start from different
methods. To want to unify them is mere intellectual
arrogance: an arrogance that results in the
impoverishment of economic theory. There is no need
to find a model that unifies everything. We can
perfectly well use one theory or the other, according
to the point that we are trying to explain. A strictly
neoclassical form of macroeconomics is a contradiction:
it is macroeconomics without the very object of that
discipline: the economic cycles. A purely neoclassical
theory of economic development makes still less sense,
since the general equilibrium model is essentially static.
9 Lawson adds: Mainstream’s insistence in the universal application
of formalist methods presumes, for its legitimacy, that the social
world is closed everywhere, that event regularities are ubiquitous.
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When the neoclassical economists finally arrived at a
compatible model of development —the Solow
model— this represented, substantively, only a small
advance over what Smith, Marx, Schumpeter and the
pioneers of development theory of the 1940s and 1950s
had taught us on development. The same may be said
of the Keynesian model of development of Harrod and
Domar. The main merit of both models was the fact
that they were consistent with their corresponding
theories, rather than the fact of explaining the
development process. The Solow model eventually
proved to be more useful, not because of that logical-
deductive consistency, but rather because —since it
was based on a Cobb-Douglas function— it made it
possible to conduct a great deal of empirical research,
not precisely historical, but predominantly inductive.
IV
Furtado’s method
One of the ways in which Furtado evidenced his
independence of thought was the fact that he remained
faithful to the historical-inductive method, even though
orthodoxy, over the last eighty years, became more and
more logical-deductive. Of course, he made abundant
use of his logical-deductive ability, but he always did
so on the basis of the historical facts and their tendency
to repetition, rather on a presumption of rational
behaviour. As an economic historian, it was natural for
him to use predominantly the historical-inductive
method, but he also continued to do so when he took
on the role of a theorist on development and
underdevelopment.
I am not suggesting, therefore, that Furtado
belongs to Gide’s German historicist school, or to
Veblen’s American institutionalism. Those schools
were characterized by their rejection of economic
theory and by their efforts to analyse economic facts
on a case-by-case basis, whereas Furtado used the
available economic theory and tried to make it advance
in the understanding of economic development.
Even as an economic historian, Furtado was,
above all, an economist rather than a historian. He does
not recount the history of the Brazilian economy, he
analyzes it. No one made use of economic theory more
brilliantly to understand the evolution of the Brazilian
economy than Furtado in his Formação Econômica do
Brasil (The Economic Formation of Brazil) (1959). As
Francisco Iglesias, a historian, remarked: although this
is a book on economic history it is a book from an
economist’s point of view... in this analysis of economic
processes one arrives at a great simplicity, at an ideal
model, at forms that sometimes look as if they were
abstract. This is what happens in many parts of Celso
Furtado’s book; the rigor of construction of this book
is such that... it makes its reading difficult for those
who lack a vast store of historical information and a
certain knowledge of economic theory (Iglesias, 1971,
pp. 200-201).
Along the same lines, Lebrun points out: history,
as it is practiced by Celso Furtado, is only worthwhile
for its extreme accuracy (author’s emphasis)... This is
his method: no assertion that is not based on facts or
on statistical data. But, I would add, data that are used
with great intelligence and deductive ability. One of
the features that makes Formação Econômica do Brasil
a masterpiece of history and economic analysis is
Furtado’s ability to deduce, from the scarce available
data, the other variables of the economy and their
dynamic behaviour. But, in doing that, Furtado is not
abandoning the primacy of the historical-inductive
method. He is only showing his ability to combine his
creativity with his logical rigour in order to present,
from the available data, a general picture of the
historical evolution of the Brazilian economy which is
as yet unsurpassed. Formação Econômica do Brasil is
for me the most important book published in the
twentieth century on Brazil, because in it Furtado was
able to use economic theory and the other social
sciences not to describe, but to analyze the economic
history of Brazil.
I will give an example of his independence and
method in that book. From chapter 16 on, Furtado is
writing about the nineteenth century. It should be
noted, however, that although he had just participated
in the founding of Latin American structuralism in
Santiago, Chile, he was not led by imperialist
explanations of our underdevelopment, and declares,
with respect to the 1810 and 1827 privileged
agreements with England: the common criticism made
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of these agreements, that they precluded Brazilian
industrialization at that stage, seems to be unfounded
(Furtado, 1959, p. 122). On the basis of the country’s
export data and terms of trade, he observes that the first
half of the century was a period of stagnation: in fact,
per capita income fell from US$ 50 to US$ 43 (at the
exchange rate of the 1950s). The next fifty years,
however, showed great expansion, thanks to the
increase in exports and the substantial improvement in
the terms of trade. Once again the analysis starts from
some historically verified facts, in order to infer the
economy’s general behaviour and, of course, to connect
it with the social aspects. The landowners are not
undifferentiated, as they are usually seen. The new
ruling class of coffee growers was very different from
the old patriarchal class of the sugar plantations. It had
commercial experience, and therefore the interests of
production and trade were intertwined. On the other
hand, he devotes four chapters to the problem of
labour, stressing the importance of immigration and
wage labour. This may seem obvious, but it deserves
emphasis to show that he was an author who did not
transform the economy into mere abstractions, but
thought of it as a historically situated political
economy.
I will take my second example from his ground-
breaking theoretical book: Desenvolvimento e
Subdesenvolvimento (Development and Underde-
velopment) (Furtado, 1961). In chapter 1, he
summarizes his broader methodological view, and
remarks that economic theory must be at the same time
abstract and historical: The effort towards higher levels
of abstraction must be followed by another effort,
which tries to define, based on historical realities, the
validity limits of the inferred relationships. The
fundamental duality of economic science —its abstract
and historical nature— appears, therefore, in its
entirety in the theory of economic development.
According to Furtado, the fact that economics is
taking on a more and more abstract nature is because,
from Ricardo on, its aim has been virtually limited to
the study of the division of the product, leaving in the
background the issue of development. He points out,
however, economic development is a phenomenon with
a sharp historical dimension (Furtado, 1961, p. 22). He
was to repeat this statement many times throughout his
vast work, because it is a key issue in his thought. After
introducing the “mechanism of development”, in which
he presents a few abstractions required for the
understanding of development, in chapter 3 he gives
one of the most remarkable analyses I know of “The
historical process of development”. In this chapter,
which was not included later on —in my opinion, due
to an error of judgment— and which was thus lost
during the transformation of Desenvolvimento e
Subdesenvolvimento into the more systematic and
didactic Teoria e Política do Desenvolvimento
Econômico (Theory and Politics of Economic
Development) (Furtado, 1967), he shows how the way
the economic surplus is used determines the outcome
of the development process. In pre-capitalist systems,
the surplus was primarily used for war and for building
religious temples. With the advent of capitalism, the
surplus obtained by merchants was transformed into
capital accumulation, which was henceforth to be
intrinsic to the economic system. With the industrial
revolution, however, capitalism spread to the sphere of
production. In a world of ever more rapid technical
progress and increasingly widespread competition, the
reinvestment of profits no longer satisfies the
businessman’s desire for increased profits, but becomes
a condition for the survival of enterprises. Development
becomes self-sustainable: When the production surplus
of the social organization becomes a source of income,
the accumulation process will tend to become
automated ... The strategic points of this process are
the possibility of increasing productivity and the
appropriation of the fruits of this increase by minority
groups (Furtado, 1961, pp. 120-121).
The idea is simple yet powerful. But we should
not imagine that Furtado would present only its bare
bones. What he does is to present a historical process
through which we see how development emerges side
with side with capitalism, and with all the complex
social, institutional, and cultural changes which are
inherent to it. The economic phenomenon of
productivity increase is a key issue, but it is intrinsically
connected with the emergence of new social classes
and new institutions.
The importance of institutions, which became a
key issue for the study of development in the 1990s,
was already clear for Furtado in Desenvolvimento e
Subdesenvolvimento. He explains, for instance, the
economic decline that follows the collapse of a pre-
capitalist empire such as the Roman Empire in terms
of the collapse of the Roman State apparatus, of its
military power, and of its long-matured institutions.
The surplus was appropriated by Roman citizens, and
particularly by the patricians, through the collection of
tribute from the colonies, and this gave rise to extensive
trade underwritten by Roman law. When this whole
system collapsed, economic decline was inevitable.
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Furtado says in this respect: The destruction of the
enormous administrative and military machinery that
constituted this Empire had profound consequences for
the economy of the vast area it occupied ... Once the
administrative and military system was dismantled, the
security conditions that made trade possible
disappeared; on the other hand, with the disappearance
of tributes, the main source of income of urban
populations, who lived on subsidies or rendering
services, was over (Furtado, 1961).
Institutions are therefore of fundamental
importance, but they do not occur alone. First of all,
they are part of the State, which, in the Roman case,
took on the form of an Empire. Second, it is not just a
question of ensuring economic activity —trade— but
of making feasible a way of appropriating the surplus.
In the absence as yet of capitalism and surplus value
or capitalist profit, the surplus is appropriated by force,
through tributes.
Development in the historical sense of the word
only occurs when the expansion of Islamism forces
Byzantium to turn to Italy. Powerful trade economies
are then formed in the Italian city-states, and alongside
the aristocracy, or in its place, a new bourgeois class
appears. And this trade promotes political integration,
which is eventually to lead to the emergence of national
states. In this case, institutions emerge rather as a
consequence than as a cause of development. Furtado
is explicit about this, and remarks that whereas in the
Roman Empire political integration led to trade and
development, in Europe it was long-distance trade,
adventurous and insecure, that caused political
integration. This latter, however, would soon become
a decisive factor of development itself.
Institutions and their stability are fundamental for
development —especially the greatest of them all, the
nation-state, from which the others depend. In this case
Furtado was not being original, since there is a broad
consensus about this. He adds, however, that the
capitalist system will not only produce the nation-state,
but will tend to adopt democratic institutions. This
view appears clearly in his next book, A Dialética do
Desenvolvimento (The Dialectics of Development)
(Furtado, 1964), in which he criticizes the Marxist idea
that in bourgeois society the limitations on freedom
derive from the need to defend the privileges of the
class that owns the capital goods. On the contrary, he
says, democracy arises from capitalism and from the
increasing institutional stability it provides. Such
stability not only leads the bourgeoisie to adopt
democracy as the political regime, but also ensures the
system’s economic dynamism. According to Furtado:
The reason for the progress of liberties in democratic
capitalist societies was their increasing institutional
stability. The revolutions that were directly caused by
class struggles in Western Europe completed their
cycle in the third quarter of the nineteenth centur ...
Now, this institutional stability is due to the existence
of a powerful class —the owners of the capital goods—
with broad vested interests to protect ... The progress
of civic liberties in bourgeois societies resulted less
from the effective participation of the working class in
political decisions than from the confidence that the
capitalist class acquired in a setting of flexible political
institutions (Furtado, 1964, p. 45).10
Furtado’s political economy, always based on the
historical method, is remarkable. Not only
development, but also democracy derives from
capitalism. The workers’ struggle will play a
fundamental role not only in furthering democracy but
also in ensuring, through the fight for better wages, the
growth of aggregate demand, as profits grow. In the
process of developing bourgeois democracy, which is
initially just liberal, the essential role lies with the
bourgeoisie itself and with the institutional stability it
achieves. Perhaps this institutional stability is due less
to the broad vested interests to be protected, and more
to the fact that the bourgeoisie is the first social class
that was able to appropriate the surplus without direct
use of force to levy tributes and enslave colonized
populations –which led it to become an agent of the
liberal rule of law and to become open to the advance
of democratic institutions. But in any case it is
remarkable to observe the analysis of the role of the
capitalist class in achieving institutional stability, a
stability that promotes development, which, in turn,
strengthens the democratic trends existing in society,
thus establishing a virtuous circle of self-sustainable
development.
For Furtado, the historical method is a key
element in his analysis of development, inasmuch as
it enables him to combine a grand overall view of the
historical process with the specificities of each moment
and each country. At the same time, the ability to
predict facts, which is required from every social
theory, is present here through the analysis of the
historical process of development, insofar as the
10 In the Prefácio à Nova Economia Política, Furtado (1976a) once
again gives the classical concept of the economic surplus a funda-
mental role in his analysis of the process of capitalist accumulation.
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abstract definition of development, as the increase in
productivity from capital accumulation and from the
incorporation of technical progress, acquires historical
substance, that is: it is complemented by political,
institutional, and social elements. Development is not
just capital accumulation but is also the incorporation
of technical progress, which depends on the class
structure, the political organization, and the institutional
system. Therefore, there is no development outside
history, and there is no economic development without
political and social development.
By adopting the historical method, Furtado
approaches Hegel’s dialectics and Marx’s historical
materialism, although remaining independent of them,
primarily because he attributes a greater role to human
will: The importance of dialectics for the understanding
of historical processes derives from the fact that history
... cannot be reconstructed from the multiple
phenomena that are part of it. However, through it man
intuits in the historical process this all-encompassing
view that is able to give multiplicity a unity. Marx
boldly adopted this dialectical principle when he
divided society into infrastructure and superstructure,
and into two social classes. This strategy, says Furtado,
had an extraordinary importance as a starting point
for the study of social dynamics... However, it is
necessary to admit that, at this level of generality, an
analytic model is hardly worth while as an instrument
of practical orientation. And the purpose of science
—he concludes, evidencing the pragmatism that has
always guided him— is to produce guidelines for
practical action (Furtado, 1964, pp. 14-15 and 22).
I took these passages from Dialética do
Desenvolvimento (Furtado, 1964), a book which he
wrote in the midst of the crisis of the Goulart
Administration, after resigning from the Special
Ministry of Planning, and remaining only in charge of
SUDENE (Northeast Development Agency). Among his
autobiographical books this is perhaps that which
received his greatest attention: a full summary.11 In A
Fantasia Organizada (Furtado, 1985), he clearly states
that one of his purposes was to delimit the utilization
of Marxism and dialectics in the analysis of
development. And by doing so, he restates his
commitment to the rigour of scientific method: The
second goal (of Dialética do Desenvolvimento) would
be to determine the scope of dialectics, which had come
into fashion again with Sartre’s Criticisme, while
manifesting that its use wouldn not exempt us from
applying the scientific method with rigor in the
approach to social problems. (Furtado, 1989, p. 182).
To adopt the scientific method with rigour,
however, does not mean to adopt analytical models
based on the assumption of the stable equilibrium, as
it is so common in economics. To analyze development
we need dynamic models, such as the ‘cumulative
principle’ proposed by Myrdal. More generally,
Furtado concludes: Even if we had made progress in
modeling, we must admit that, to build models, we
always start from a few intuitive hypotheses on the
behaviour of the historical process as a whole. And the
most general of those hypotheses is the one provided
by dialectics, by which historical aspects are something
that is necessarily in course of development. The idea
of development appears as a hypothesis that organizes
the historical process —as a ‘synthesis of several
determinations, unity in multiplicity’, in Marx’s
words— through which it is possible to achieve an
efficient effort of identification of relationships between
factors and of selection of those factors in order to
reconstruct this process through an analytic model
(Furtado, 1964, p. 22).12
With this exemplary text —which shows Furtado’s
elegance and ability of synthesis in expressing his
thought— he makes clear his conception of the
historical and dialectical nature of the scientific method
he adopts. I could have begun the analysis of his
method with this quotation, but I preferred to use at
the end, thus concluding my analysis with his own
words.
11 See Furtado (1989, pp. 182-190).
12 The quotation from Marx comes from his Contribution to the
Criticism of Political Science (Marx, 1970).
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In the way Celso Furtado worked with economic
science there is not only a rigorous method, there is
also passion. There are great expectations, and the
corresponding frustration. Usually reason and emotion
are seen as opposites. However, this is a misguided
way of understanding the process of thought. Great
scientists were very often people passionate about their
work, their research. The really great economists were
almost always passionate not only about their science,
but also about its results. Some of them fell in love with
the achievement of economic stability, others, with a
fairer distribution of income, and most of them, with
the development of their country.
Furtado’s passion was the development of Brazil:
a passion that was fed by the belief that this
development was within the reach of his country at the
historical moment when he graduated as an economist,
in the late 1940s. World War II had just come to an
end. New theories of economic development were
appearing. A great hope was beginning to take shape
before the eyes of the young man from Paraíba who
had just gained his Ph.D. in economics in France
(1948): Brazil, already in the course of rapid
industrialization, would overcome the structural
imbalances of its economy and, with the help of
economic theory and economic planning, would reach
the level of a developed country.
Only this passion —the passion for the idea of the
development of Brazil— explains the strength of his
thought, particularly in his first books, from his
first fundamental paper on the Brazilian economy
—“Características Gerais da Economia Brasileira”
(General Characteristics of the Brazilian Economy)
(Furtado, 1950)— and his first book —A Economia
Brasileira (The Brazilian Economy) (Furtado, 1954)—
up to Dialética do Desenvolvimento (Furtado, 1964),
written at a moment when hopes began to be shattered
by the imminence of the crisis. All these works have a
theoretical strength and a power of analysis that do not
derive just from the creativity of their author, from his
great culture, from his independence of thought, and
from his preferential use of the historical-inductive
method: they are clearly part of a life project identified
with the project of development. In Os Ares do Mundo
(The Airs of the World) (1991) he makes it clear that
his life project was directly related to the conviction
that he developed in the late 1940s that a favourable
international scenario —a consequence of the Great
Depression of the 30s and of the world conflict of the
40s— had opened a crack through which perhaps we
could sneak in to achieve a qualitative change in our
history (Furtado, 1991, p. 63).
This qualitative change was the industrialization
and the development of Brazil. But, says Furtado,
recalling 1964, when he arrived in Chile as an exile,
already by then he was convinced that, although the
intellectual has, as a characteristic, the boundless
ability of devising reasons to live, his life project,
which was based on the existence of that crack, was
ultimately an illusion ... that was now vanishing
(Furtado, 1991, pp. 45 and 63). The fantasy was gone.
His hopes had been high, but his disenchantment
and frustration were even greater, and they were going
to be expressed in his next book, Subdesenvolvimento
e Estagnação na América Latina (Underdevelopment
and Stagnation in Latin America) (Furtado, 1966): a
dense and pessimistic book that later proved to be
mistaken, as the Latin American economies entered a
new development cycle. That mistake, however, would
eventually prove to be a relative success. The
development cycle that was then beginning was
artificially financed by the foreign debt-a debt that
made the Latin American economies prisoners of
international financial capital and eventually led them
into the great crisis of the 1980s and the near-stagnation
that continues to date. I say “relative success” because
the book’s key assumption, which is influenced by
Marx and Keynes, still seems to me to be ill-placed.
He considered that the stagnation or the development
at very low rates was due, on the one hand, to the
increase in the capital-labour ratio, and on the other
hand to the decrease in the product-capital ratio, as a
result of the capital-intensive nature of the investments
made and their allocation to consumer durables. In
those conditions, he felt, capital productivity would go
down.13 This theory underestimates, in my opinion, the
increased technical progress, which saves not only
13 See Furtado (1966, p. 80).
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labour, but also capital, that is to say, it is a type of
technical progress that increases the efficiency of
capital.
In Subdesenvolvimento e Estagnação na América
Latina (1966) the idea already appears that the
concentration of income was preventing the operation
of capitalism’s virtuous circle, caused by the rise in
wages as productivity increases. In two books, Furtado
answered his critics, indirectly. In Análise do Modelo
Brasileiro (Analysis of the Brazilian Model) (Furtado,
1972) he incorporates into his thought, with great
elegance and accuracy, the new dependency theory that
had come out from the critique of his works. This did
not prevent him from clearly restating, in O Mito do
Desenvolvimento (The Myth of Development) (Furtado,
1974), his theory on the consumption shortage that
would occur in the long run. The concentration of
income of the middle and upper classes would not
solve the problem of demand in the development
process. As he puts it: My basic assumption is that the
system has not been able to spontaneously produce the
profile of demand that could assure a steady growth
rate, and that long-term growth depends on
government exogenous actions ... Although those two
groups (the big companies and the modernized
minorities) have convergent interests, the system is not
structurally prepared to generate the kind of expansion
of demand that is required to ensure its growth.
Now, this theory, as Keynes showed when he
criticized Say’s law, is valid in the short run for
explaining the economic cycle. And in my opinion it
is only valid in the long run to the extent that the
development rate attained in that time lapse depends
on keeping the demand in constant tension with supply
in the short run. The new model of technocratic-
capitalist development that was then being established
in Brazil, producing industrialized underdevelopment,
eventually failed, but not due to a problem of lack of
demand, but rather to an irresponsible excess of foreign
indebtedness.
Hope was still present for Celso Furtado when,
in 1968, before the adoption of Institutional Act N° 5,
which definitively established the dictatorship in Brazil,
he was invited by the Brazilian House of
Representatives to present his views on what could be
done. He could not resist the opportunity, and wrote
Um Projeto para o Brasil (A Project for Brazil)
(Furtado, 1968a), in which he proposes the resumption
of development through a substantial increase in the
tax burden and public savings. However, if once again
there was hope —the refusal to accept dependency and
underdevelopment— pessimism persisted. The
pessimistic analysis of the situation of Brazil was so
consistent with the one in Subdesenvolvimento e
Estagnação da América Latina that the first criticisms
of that perspective’s claims that the resumption of
Brazilian development was taking place thanks to the
concentration of income in the middle and upper
classes, which created a demand for luxury consumer
goods, were made on the basis of the analyses made
in those two books.
The optimistic passion that had fed his actions
now became the great frustration of someone who
recognized not only that he no longer directly
influenced the country’s destiny, but that the country
itself had lost the ability for endogenous development.
The economic theory he used now became debatable
as it involved a twofold pessimism: on the one hand
regarding the ability of underdeveloped economic
systems to achieve capital-intensive technical progress
and not merely capital-saving progress or at least a
neutral situation (i.e., not involving a decrease in
capital productivity), and on the other hand, regarding
the ability of supply to create demand in the long run.
His pessimism appears in the following quotation,
taken from Os Ares do Mundo, in which he recalls his
first months of exile in Santiago: I couldn’t escape the
idea that history is an open process, and that it is naive
to imagine that the future is absolutely contained in the
past and in the present. But, when every relevant
change is a result of the intervention of external factors,
we are confined to a setting of strict dependency ... The
trends that appeared in Brazil led to the thought that
significant changes would no longer be the result of
the action of endogenous factors (Furtado, 1991, p. 63).
Um Projeto para o Brasil was Furtado’s last clear
manifestation of hope.14  His work from then on,
according to Francisco de Oliveira, “may be called
‘philosophical’” (de Oliveira, 1983a, p. 23). I would
say that it becomes serene, to the extent that exile, first
in Chile, then in the United States, in England, and
finally, for a long time, in France, imposes emotional
detachment. On Latin America, Furtado was still to
publish in 1969 a fundamental work, Formação
Econômica da América Latina (The Economic
Formation of Latin America) (Furtado, 1969), but
14 In O Brasil Pós-Milagre (Brazil After the Miracle), Furtado still
shows hope, when, after mentioning the bad governments of the 1970s,
he writes two sections in which he looks to the future: “Os Desafios
dos Anos 80” (The Challenges of the 80s) and “Esboço de uma
Estratégia” (Outline of a Strategy) (Furtado, 1981a, pp. 56-90).
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afterwards he became once again interested in the
analysis of the historical process of development, and
in the changes that the international economy was
undergoing.
He returns to the development process in O Mito do
Desenvolvimento (Furtado, 1974), Pequena Introdução ao
Desenvolvimento: Enfoque Interdisciplinar (A Small
Introduction to Development: Interdisciplinary
Approach) (Furtado, 1980), “Underdevelopment: to
Conform or Reform” (Furtado, 1987a) and in many
other works. The changes in the world economy are
analyzed, however, in a 1968 paper, “A Preeminência
Mundial da Economia dos Estados Unidos Pós-Guerra”
(The Global Pre-eminence of the United States
Economy in the Post-war Period) (Furtado, 1968b). In
1981, in the first issue of the Revista de Economia
Política, of which he became one of the sponsors
(along with Caio Prado Jr. and Ignacio Rangel), he
published the article “Estado e Empresas
Transnacionais na Industrialização Periférica” (The
State and the Transnational Corporations in the
Industrialization of the Periphery) (Furtado, 1981b). All
his other works on the subject were later to be gathered
together in Transformação e Crise na Economia
Mundial (Change and Crisis in the Global Economy)
(1987b) and O Capitalismo Global (Global Capitalism)
(1998).
In the 1970s Furtado once again took an active
part in international meetings at which the developing
countries demanded “a new international division of
labour”. This movement was successful for a while,
but, with the foreign debt crisis, and the neoliberal
wave that took over Washington and the world from
the beginning of the 1980s, this project did not bear
the expected fruits either. This was the beginning of
the great crisis of the 1980s for Latin America, and in
its presence, Celso Furtado’s passion returned as
strongly as his indignation. His books Não à Recessão
e ao Desemprego (No to Recession and Unemployment)
(Furtado, 1983) and Brasil: A Construção
Interrompida (Brazil: The Interrupted Construction)
(Furtado, 1992) are the evidence of such indignation.15
His return from exile and his participation in the
Sarney administration, as Minister of Culture, did not
change his feelings of frustration and indignation.16
But in 1999, when stability was restored and there were
signs of some resumption of development, hope
returned, although he remained a strong critic of the
economic policy of the Cardoso administration. In his
last book up to the time of writing this paper, O Longo
Amanhecer (The Long Sunrise) (Furtado, 1999), he
expresses his disenchantment strongly: At no other
moment in our history was the distance between what
we are and what we wanted to be so great. He restates
his criticism of globalization, which, through
irresponsible foreign indebtedness, led the country to
the great crisis, but he observes that globalization itself
and its lack of control are not to blame for our inability
to resume development, but rather the way our elites
have reacted to it, by deciding to uncritically adopt an
economic policy that privileges transnational
companies, whose rationality can only be assessed in
the setting of a system of forces that goes beyond the
specific interests of the countries that are part of it. An
example of this alienation is the proposal made by
ECLAC itself, in February 1999, for the dollarization of
Latin American economies: a process that, according
to that international organization, was already quite
advanced (Furtado, 1999, pp. 18, 23 and 26).
In his short speech at a seminar held in São Paulo
in his honour, “Reflections On the Brazilian Crisis”
(Furtado, 2000), his criticism is not only directed
against governments, but against the Brazilian elites in
general. He particularly rejects the explanations (for the
nearly-stagnation) that pretend to ignore the moral
responsibilities of the elites. In face of the expressions
of support for dollarization that were then current in
the press (today probably forgotten in view of the
Argentine crisis), he remarks that “if we surrender to
dollarization, we will revert to semi-colonial status.
As in his last book (1999), however, in this paper
we see that hope is back at last. In the book, in which
there is a section whose title is “What is to be done?”,
he stresses the need to reverse the process of
15 Between those two books he wrote his three remarkable
autobiographical books which I already mentioned: A Fantasia Organi-
zada (1985), A Fantasia Desfeita (1989), and Os Ares do Mundo (1991).
16 In 1984 Furtado publishes a collection of essays under the title
Cultura e Desenvolvimento em Época de Crise (Culture and
Development in an Era of Crisis), whose key subject was still the
crisis in the Brazilian economy, but which probably inspired
President José Sarney to invite him to accept the post of Minister
of Culture. I was a fellow-minister of his, between April and
December 1987, when I was Minister of Finance. He was
enormously concerned about the fact that the democratic government
was not only unable to cope with the crisis, but actually made it
worse. He felt as helpless as he was concerned, because he was in
a ministry which, while it enabled him to give me strong support
when I needed it, did not allow him to modify the direction of the
Brazilian economy. Eventually, I served for only a short time in the
administration, and I was not able to stabilize the Brazilian economy
either.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 4  •   D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 4
METHOD AND PASSION IN CELSO FURTADO • LUIZ CARLOS BRESSER-PEREIRA
33
concentration of income, to invest in human capital,
and, above all, to cope with the problem of
globalization by strengthening the national State, which
is the privileged instrument for dealing with structural
problems (Furtado, 1999, pp. 32-34). In his brief
speech he restates one of his key ideas: the importance
of political creativity. Only political creativity impelled
by collective will can enable us to break the impasse
(Furtado, 2000, p. 4).17
The great master always continued to think along
those lines. I don’t always agree with him, as should
have become apparent at some point in this paper, but
I have always admired him. Celso Furtado was one of
my masters, when —still very young— I became
interested in economics. I still learn from him. His
contribution to the understanding of Brazil is
unparalleled; his analysis of development and
underdevelopment is a landmark in contemporary
thought. In this text, which is not a general overview
of his work, I have merely tried to define a few points
regarding the author, the political economist: Furtado
never made compromises with respect to his
independence of thought; his method has always been
rigorous and mainly historical-inductive; and he never
ceased to regard and think with passion of Brazil and
his Northeast.
(Original: English)
17 In this paper I have not been concerned with eliminating prejudices
regarding Celso Furtado. In view of this last quotation, however, I
feel that it should be noted that one should not infer from it that
Furtado was a partisan of State control – the usual accusation the
Right Wing habitually makes against someone who defends the
importance of a reconstructed State, able to promote the country’s
economic and political development. There still are a few partisans
of State control, but he was definitely not one of them. In a debate
promoted by the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo, for instance,
Furtado said: The point is, therefore, to abandon the old idea that
the State should solve all problems. We know perfectly well that
when the State controls everything, few control the State (Furtado,
1976b, p. 39).
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